This paper deals with the Swedish Aliens Act and the "Provisions on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs" - the so called "third pillar" - of the European Union. More specifically, it is about the "free movement of persons" and its implications for Swedish refugee policy. It also examines the context of Swedish party politics.
From the view of political science, the starting point is the nation state's objective to maintain control over its actions - when entering a union without internal frontiers the nation state loses sovereignty as it is being deprived of the right to check the influx of aliens from the other contracting nation states. To regain control, the nation states involved demand influence over each other's national policies governing the entry of aliens at the external borders of the union. The demand is met by the harmonization of the relevant national policies.
As one of the relevant policies is refugee policy, I put forward the politically interesting question: Is Swedish membership in the European Union a case for an adjusted refugee policy? The principal purpose is to find an answer to this overarching question. I seek to fulfil this purpose by comparing Swedish refugee policy as manifested in the Swedish Aliens Act of 1989, and its preparatory documents, with the refugee policy of the European Union as expressed in documents coming from the interstate cooperation accomplished prior to the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union, and on this treaty itself.
In addition, I compare the Swedish parliamentary parties' proposals on refugee policy before and after the Swedish application for membership. As I compare the parties' refugee policies at two different points of time, I have only included the parties with seats in the Parliament on both these occasions. I build this analysis on parliamentary protocols, party bills, committee reports, party programmes, and interviews with party representatives.
In both the analyses I examine four components of refugee policy: visa requirements, right to asylum, admission on humanitarian grounds, and sanctions on carriers. Prior to the analyses, I provide summaries of previously available academic studies and governmental reports.
The detected implications for Swedish refugee policy show that Swedish membership in the European Union is a case for an adjusted refugee policy; Swedish membership in the European Union will, at least when it comes to visa requirements and sanctions on carriers, imply a more restrictive Swedish refugee policy.
When it comes to the analysis of Swedish refugee politics, the following conclusions are made: 1. In all, the Liberal Party excluded, the refugee policies of the examined parties were consistent; 2. Only the Moderate Party's position on refugee policy is consistent with Swedish membership in the European Union; 3. The changes found in the Liberal Party's refugee policy can be seen as an adjustment to the provisions of the European Union.
The final conclusion concerning the adjustment of Swedish refugee policy is then modified; it is established that Swedish membership in the European Union is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for an imperative adjustment. This since also the coincident existence of the European Union and the Nordic Passport Union is a sufficient condition. Moreover, the discussion about harmonization shows that in the long run, regardless of membership, or continued existence of the Nordic Passport Union, harmonization is necessary if we want to avoid further Swedish restrictions as well as further restrictive measures by the Member States of the European Union.